Two readers penned letters to the editor for the March 16 issue of Navy Times. Have thoughts you'd like to share on Navy Times stories or letters? Send them to navylet@navytimes.com. Include your name, address, phone number and rank. Submissions may be published in print and online.
* * *
HELICOPTER SQUADRON SHUTDOWN: SIGN OF A LARGER PROBLEM
I'm writing in response to the March 2 article "Navy to shutter two Rescue Hawk squadrons."
Having been involved in this issue for the past two years, it is a shame how this has played out. As much support as there is to continue to fund these two reserve squadrons from several combatant commands, theater special operations commands, and Department of Defense agencies, they could not overcome the mistrust and parochialism that resided within U.S. Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations Forces and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Two important points for readers:
1. The great lie perpetrated by SOCOM is its statement that it can compensate for the loss of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadrons 84 and 85 with improvements in resourcing Army SOF rotary wing assets and Air Force Special Operations Command CV-22s. With HSC-84/85, SOCOM was only meeting roughly 75 percent of all requested training by special operations forces. Now, with a 41 percent reduction in platforms, there is no way it can meet the demand; in fact, it will only get worse. The CV-22 is a great platform, but it is not a helicopter and cannot replace rotary wing aircraft in many SOF mission sets. In addition, operational commitments will not decrease but remain steady or increase when the next crisis arises.
2. The Navy is engaged in the wholesale dismantling of Naval Air Reserve assets. Active Reserve Integration, implemented in 2002, was designed to realign the reserves to better support fleet and COCOM requirements. The active Navy assumed resource sponsorship for reserve acquisition, and validates and funds recognized reserve capabilities to help support requirements. What happened was a 50 percent decrease in reserve squadrons, to the point that we are now down to only 10 tactical squadrons. The reserve helicopter community had five squadrons and a wing in 2005. With the loss of HSC-84/85, we will only have one squadron left, Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light 60, with seven helicopters.
The Navy's helicopter master plan provided for alignment of reserve squadrons to look the same, train the same and, when needed, deploy seamlessly with the fleet. The master plan had five squadrons whittled down to three, with HSC-84 and HSC-85 flying the MH-60S, supporting the fleet. In 2009, Adm. Gary Roughead, the CNO, directed HSC-84 and 85 to focus on SOF support at SOCOM's request. The document that links the two squadrons to SOCOM is only a memo of agreement, signed in late 2010. The Navy could walk away from this MOA and re-mission the two squadrons back to fleet support if it wanted to, but as history has shown, the reserves are once again a disproportionate bill payer for the Navy to meet Budget Control Act requirements.
We are going to completely cut capability to maintain excess capacity and resourcing in the active Navy, and the Reserve can't do anything to stop it. Navy officials' response that SOF support is not a core Navy mission is not a fair comment, but it does support their argument for cutting the squadrons. HSC-84 and 85 support counter-terrorism, irregular warfare and many other missions that are core DoD and Navy missions. The squadrons' mission statements are similar to the fleet, so turning them back into Navy Reserve squadrons would be easy, but the Navy already plans to use their new helicopters in the active fleet.
It's not just helicopters. Look what is happening to the patrol (VP) and strike fighter/fleet fighter (VFA/VFC) communities. In short order, the Naval Air Reserve will no longer be tactical, but just provide fleet logistics services. If that's the case, I will lobby for the Air Force to absorb the VR community. Then we can really save the Navy some money.
Capt. Sean Butcher (ret.)
Former CO, HSC-84
Charlotte, N.C.
* * *
INITIATIONS SERVE PURPOSE
I am writing in response to the March 9 article, "In the eye of the beholder: MCPON says chief induction is not a tradition, and he has research to back him."
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Mike Stevens and the report demonize CPO initiation, which I think is a distortion of reality. Stevens is attempting to rewrite history by denying that initiations produced any benefits. By constantly bringing this subject up in the media, the message I get is that Stevens has no respect for the CPO community, since this subject should be addressed within the CPO community.
The decision to allow CPO initiation should be made within the chief's mess, but crucial decisions on CPO business are dysfunctional and decided without their input. You have to be wearing either a CMC or a Force CMC badge to even have a voice, a voice that does not have the interests of the CPO community in mind. These positions, too, often have become political, self-serving and just an extension of the wardroom. The rank and file CPOs are de facto hostages, virtually cut out of any meaningful input in determining the direction of the CPO community.
Despite what Stevens says, there were many positive aspects of CPO initiation, along with promoting camaraderie. CPO Initiation did have a lot of value, fostering better teamwork and a sense of pride, along with a feeling of accomplishment and esprit de corps. One of the concepts I learned during the initiation was written on a plaque, which stated in part, "You were subjected to humiliation to prove to you that humility is good, a great, a necessary attribute which cannot mar you — in fact, it strengthens you."
A vast majority of CPOs did not consider this hazing or harassment. Also, I am sure that if a poll were conducted today within the CPO community, the majority would indicate that the CPO initiation should continue. The problems that did occur with the initiation should (and could) have been corrected and kept within the mess, but unfortunately this did not happen, which is the fault of the CPO community.
Certainly the Tailhook scandal played a large role in the diminishing not only of the CPO initiation, but of all initiations, such as the shellback initiation. I believe that had Tailhook not occurred, we would still have CPO initiations.
The whole concept of the CPO initiation should not be devalued by saying it served no purpose whatsoever. Has the elimination of chief's initiation really improved the CPO community? I don't think so.
YNC (SW/AW) Bernard Michael Burawski (ret.)
Miramar, Fla.
